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ABSTRACT 
Money launderers hide traces of their transactions with the involvement of 
entities that participate in sophisticated schemes. Money laundering detection 
requires unraveling concealed connections among multiple but seemingly 
unrelated human money laundering networks, ties among actors of those 
schemes, and amounts of funds transferred among those entities. The link 
among small networks, either financial or social, is the primary factor that 
facilitates money laundering. Hence, the analysis of relations among money 
laundering networks is required to present the full structure of complex 
schemes. We propose a framework that uses sequence matching, case-based 
analysis, social network analysis, and complex event processing to detect 
money laundering. Our framework captures an ongoing single scheme as an 
event, and associations among such ongoing sequence of events to capture 
complex relationships among evolving money laundering schemes. The 
framework can detect associated multiple money laundering networks even in 
the absence of some evidence. We validated the accuracy of detecting evolving 
money laundering schemes using a multi-phases test methodology. Our test 
used data generated from real-life cases, and extrapolated to generate more data 
from real-life schemes generator that we implemented. 
Keywords: Anti Money Laundering, Social Network Analysis, Complex 
Event Processing 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Current Anti Money Laundering (AML) systems are designed to function 
based on the requirements of adopting organization. They vary from the multi-
component and complex systems such as FINCEN (FAIS) to the specialized 
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single-purpose systems used by banks to report Due Diligence and Suspicious 
Activity Reports (SAR). To capture increasingly complex money laundering 
schemes (MLS) call for integrating new techniques such as Social Network 
Analysis (SNA) (Wasserman et al., 1994), in addition to the already used rule 
based analysis and risk modeling. An efficient AML system must have many 
components, where some components are being purely deterministic and others 
being purely probabilistic. An example of a probabilistic component is the risk 
analysis, and SNA is an example of a deterministic component. Generally, 
deterministic models consider social aspects and statistical models consider 
financial aspects (Wasserman et al., 1994). 
The FINCEN AI System (FAIS) (Senator et al., 1995, 1996, 1998) designed 
for internal use analyzes SARs filed by banks. The system combines offline 
SAR data analyzed by human experts to identify possible hidden linkage 
among transactions using link analysis techniques. However, FAIS (Senator et 
al., 1995, 1996, 1998) only links and evaluates the database (DB) of the 
reported suspicious transactions offline. KDPrevent (Jacobs et al., 2003; Kuns 
et al., 2004) by KDLabs, a commercial product/service utilized by banks in 
Switzerland collect customer, account and transaction information for offline 
analysis, combining data-mining techniques with expert legal knowledge of 
legal experts.  
Two models of sequence matching and link analysis (Liu et al., 2008; Schwartz 
et al., 2008) are relevant to our research in detecting evolving patterns of 
sequence. Liu (Liu et al., 2008) proposes a sequence matching algorithm to 
discover suspicious transaction sequences, using transaction histories of an 
individual’s accounts and transaction information histories from a peer group. 
(Liu et al., 2008) focus only on the bank transactions, without covering other 
financial transactions such as stock market. Schwartz (Schwartz et al., 2008) 
proposes a model to find criminal networks using social network analysis, 
building upon Borgatti’s SNA-based key player approach (Schwartz et al., 
2008). One drawback of Borgatti's model is the failure to assign weights to 
actors and actor-actor relationships. Gunestas, et al.’s framework (Gunestas et 
al., 2008, 2010) is similar to ours, but with a narrower focuses on detecting 
Ponzi schemes.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the Money 
Laundering Evolution Detection Framework (MLEDF) and Section 3 describe 
proposes a new ML detection algorithm. Section 4 evaluates the performance 
results of MLEDF using real-life cases. Section 5 describes related work and 
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
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2. MONEY LAUNDERING EVOLUTION DETECTION FRAMEWORK 
(MLEDF) 
The framework is composed of four different phases. Each phase will 
communicate with the next phase, and the output generated from each phase is 
sent into the next phase. The phases and their function are explained below. 
Transaction Data Collection: The transaction agents or data input collectors 
from Automated Clearing House such as (EPN, FEDWIRE, and CHIPS) will 
send in their data format. The different types of transaction data are: Banking, 
Stock market, Derivative market, Web Services, Trading, Electronic Money, 
and Money Brokering. Once the industry-specific transaction data is gathered, 
relevant information is extracted for analysis. For example, there are more than 
20 fields in stock order forms and we use only time, sender, receiver, price, 
quantity, symbol, market, sellerOrderID, buyerOrderID, tradeID, and country. 
Also, we use transaction-independent data used in the analysis, such as the 
economic status of the country, sales trends of the stock, and the stock value 
during the day.  
1. Data Processing: The data collected from different systems are used to 
create patterns of the well-known MLS (Mehmet et al., 2010). The MLS-
related data that is extracted from the streaming events is filtered before 
submitting them into the detection algorithms. The extracted data associated 
with each MLS pattern assigned to a specific MLS type using the following 
components:  
a) Business Rules: MLS business rules and red flags associated with 
each pattern, the rules associated with specific sector are used by the 
MLS detection algorithms to identify the MLS patterns.  
b) MLS Template: Well-known MLS templates will be used during this 
phase. Currently, the templates have seven major pattern types with 
their different subtype combinations. This acts as a repository of 
known MLS. If a new form of MLS is discovered, then it will be 
added to this DB.   
c) ML Economic Models: Three ML economic models (Mehmet et al., 
2013) will be used to validate and increase the accuracy of the 
detection algorithms for well-known ML patterns. Those economic 
models determine if the evolution of MLS is within the accepted 
trend of the models.  
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Figure 1The MLEDF framework 
2. MLS Algorithms and MLS Network Detection: There are six major 
heterogeneous algorithm modules (Smurfing, Trade, Stock, Derivative, 
EMoney, DirtyEFT). Each algorithm uses a different method to capture the 
network associated with the specific type of MLS.  In real-time, the 
algorithms output, the discovered networks associated with the specific MLS 
patterns, each into a different database. Then, the discovered networks are 
reformatted and saved in a single database referred to as the “Network” 
Database. This process facilitates faster and efficient analysis of the links 
among MLS networks.  
3. Evolution Detection Analysis and Generating the Fraud Trail and 
Suspicious Trail: Four separate algorithms are run to find the “Full-Trail”, 
“Missing-Trail”, and “Suspicious-Trail” (Mehmet et al., 2013) of MLS 
networks, and saved in separate databases. Full-Trail is a long series of 
MLS’s that span over many countries and involves many cycles of MLS. In 
essence, it is a concatenated sequence of related schemes (MLS) act in itself 
to transfer money from one MLS to the other until it reaches the final MLS, 
where we refer to the orchestrator (i.e., the money launderer) as the 
“EndBoss” in the final MLS. Any MLS or trail will have the originator 
“StartBoss” and the terminator “EndBoss”, in addition to the associates that 
maintain the MLS or trail. The “Associates” are the list of the people 
involved in the sequence of detected fraud. The “StartBoss” is the entity 
whom starts the MLS or trail. Missing-Trail is a short Full-Trail that does 
not exceed the depths of three related MLSs. We assume that the Missing-
Trail is a premature Full-Trail with broken parts and missing links or 
evidence. A Suspicious-Trail is a combination of discovered Full-Trails 
and/or Missing-Trails, it will be constructed using algorithms that 
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incorporate SNA and numerical analysis techniques. The module “Detection 
Analysis” (Mehmet et al., 2013) determines the evolution of the “Full-
Trail”s such as the change to the number of involved associates, the changes 
to the cost of laundering, and changes to the laundering locations. 
2.1 MLS Pattern Detection Modules in MLEDF 
MLEDF process is fed by data from many types of transaction data, where 
each feed is from a particular market or a finance industry. The main detection 
module is divided into sub-modules, where each sub-module detects money 
laundering patterns relevant to that specific market. This is because the data set 
of each market and industry is different than others and the money laundering 
techniques differ between them. MLEDF uses a core set of business rules to 
detect the evolution of MLS reported annually by FATF, with six detection 
patterns for each finance sector that we chose to include in our experiment.   
2.2 Gathering Transaction Data and Generation of the Transaction 
Evidence Data    
A “Message” sent between two parties in the framework consists of the 
following components: (1) Common Mandatory Fields: Sender, Receiver, 
Time, Transaction ID, and a field that reflects the amount of funds transferred 
or price of the transaction; (2) Pattern Specific Mandatory Fields: A set of 
attributes pertinent to the transaction type. For example, the Smurfing 
transaction will have only the "EFT" field that reflects whether the banking 
transaction is an EFT or not. The stock transaction has more fields as in 
"Quantity, Symbol, Market, TradeID, Country, etc."; and (3) Auxiliary Third 
Party Fields: The framework retrieves critical data from third party sources, 
used in conjunction with the transaction data. The auxiliary data includes 
information such as recent market stock and derivative data, current product 
market price, and country economic status. This data is used to compare the 
transaction price and product price with the nominal price.  
The “Comprehensive Output” is the MLS pattern-specific output generated by 
the MLS detection algorithm. As seen in figure 2, the output produces 
comprehensive evidence for each detected pattern, and it is different from other 
patterns. The output is saved in a separate database. For example, the field 
“Associates” exists in most of the outputs, it is a list of the people involved in 
the sequence of detected fraud. The size of the list varies because the list will 
expand as the money transfers from one entity to the next entity, until it 
reaches the final destination or terminates with a fund withdrawal.  
The number of the transactions (which can be modeled as steps in an event) 
required to create a MLS vary based on the MLS type. We link the set of 
transactions that constitute the comprehensive-output for a specific MLS. Any 
previously examined transaction that is related to the current transaction under 
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examination is linked to the output of the current transaction, if the transactions 
share common fields and involve a fund transfer. For example, all the 
associates who are involved in a Smurfing fraud will be placed in the list of 
“Associates”, and the manipulator is represented in the field “Boss”.  
All the data gathered from pattern detection are reduced to the minimum set 
that represents what we define as the “Network”, which constitutes the entities 
created the MLS and information about MLS. These entities are “EndBoss”, 
“StartBoss”, and “Associates”. The “Network” DB contains fields of 
participants and vital information of a detected MLS.  Each network will be 
assigned a unique ID. The nine fields in the “Network” are: NetworkID, 
EndBoss, StartBoss, AmountLaundered, Associates, Type, DetectionTime, 
StartTime, EndTime. A network can be associated only with one type of MLS; 
therefore, the field “Types” represents the various well-known types of MLS 
(Mehmet et al., 2010).  
The evolution-output “Detection-Schema” is generated by the “Detection-
Analysis” module. The DB “Detection-Schema” contains information about 
the evolution of the ML trail, such as information of average cost and average 
number of associates used in each of the sequence of MLSs in the Full-Trail.  
 
Figure 2 The “Comprehensive Output” (DB content) of the Output of Six MLS 
Detection Algorithms 
3. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS MODULE TO CREATE A 
“SUSPICIOUS-TRAIL” 
There are many cases in which money launderers intentionally obfuscate the 
money laundering trail, either by hiding it (for instance by increasing the 
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transaction quantity and reducing the transaction amount), or performing it in a 
none-reported method as in Hawala. It becomes the task of an AML to detect 
these concealed relations and transactions. As a solution, we offer an additional 
module for social network analysis among transactions to unravel the hidden 
relations among MLS networks. MLEDF is designed from bottom-up with the 
concept of detecting and linking MLS trails (networks) even with missing 
evidence.  
The major task of this module is to detect components of an actual “Full-Trail” 
even if there is a missing piece of evidence. The module will investigate the 
available trails (Full-Trail and Missing-Trail) by using our SNA DB that 
contains the weights of relationships among MLS participants. This is in order 
to determine if two trails are related by considering some attributes such as the 
amount of funds involved, location, affinity of participants, time, and methods 
used for laundering. 
The SNA module is more resource consuming when compared to other 
modules, due to the extensive use of SNA, and link and weight calculations. 
The “Suspicious-Trail” module uses the “SNA” module to produce a new trail. 
This new trail contains two or more trails that are related based on SNA, even 
if we do not have captured a transaction joining them or any other evidence. 
The new trail is created after making a scientific calculation based on (SNA) 
results of a possible relationship between two or more “Full-Trails” and 
“Missing-Trails”.  
The generated evolution patterns and strategies are collected into the 
“Suspicious-Trail” Database. This module contains the “SNA” sub-module that 
calculates and assesses the social network connections of individuals, peer-
groups, and money laundering trails. The sub-module “SNA” is used to derive 
the associated suspicious trails based on the techniques of SNA. The table 
“Weight” that is used within the module is completely constructed with data 
output from running the “SNA” module.  
3.1 Using Complex Event Processing in the Social Network Analysis 
Module 
Any MLS has the originator “StartBoss” and the terminator “EndBoss”, in 
addition to the associates that maintains the MLS. The output of MLS detection 
algorithms contains information about the participants, in addition to 
information such as amount laundered, final amount of funds, type of MLS, 
duration and start and end time. The critical question that ML experts contend 
to answer is “How fast and how well can we relate the different events in this 
universe of detected MLS?” Using the introduction of Complex Event 
Processing (CEP) systems like StreamBase, we developed an algorithm to 
create the full and accurate chains of related MLSs, such relations are used to 
transfer a fund to the next MLS until it reaches the final destination. That is, 
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the flow of the dirty money never stops until it reached the ultimate account. 
This cycle continues until it reached the final destination where the money 
launderer withdraws the money. Current AML systems have scalability issues 
in associating the multitude of different events of various MLS. We model 
each detected MLS as an event, and have various patterns of events categorized 
under six different types of MLS. For example, Full-Trail algorithm outputs a 
trail by using the functionality of CEP of perceiving the MLSs as a set of 
events. Without the CEP the MLS should dissolve into the constituent 
transactions to be analyzed and linked with the other transactions from another 
MLS (Time consuming and resource consuming). The CEP can link MLSs, 
perceived as events, using various criterions without the need to add more 
complex sub-algorithms for each criterion. That is, the Full-Trail connects the 
dots that exist, but it is harder and slower to connect them without CEP 
capabilities. Full-Trail captures the trail in cases where all evidence is 
available, whereas the Suspicious-Trail attempts to construct the path where 
some edges along the path is missing. 
3.2 Integrating the “SNA” Module into MLEDF 
The major objective of the “SNA” module is to detect components of a 
undiscovered Full-Trails by performing analysis on the four databases 
“Network”, “Detection-Schema”, “Full-Trail”, and “Missing-Trail”. During the 
relationship analysis stage, the SNA module investigate the available trails, by 
using SNA Database that contains the weight of relations to determine if two 
trails are related considering attributes, such as amount of funds involved, 
geography, affinity of participants, time, method for laundering, relation. 
The module “SNA” analyzes the end and start points (“EndBoss” and 
“StartBoss”) of discovered transaction sequence (trail) to discover any broken 
parts of such none-discovered trail. This analysis includes assessing the social 
relationships between the endpoints (“EndBoss” and “StartBoss”) of trails with 
each other, using the DB created that includes different level of relationships. 
The participants and bosses of money laundering trails may change, but the key 
players stay the same and they swap roles (Mehmet et al., 2013).  
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Figure 3 The Process of Generating Evidence Data in the MLEDF 
3.3 Input from Algorithmic Modules and their Databases into 
the “SNA” Module 
This section describes modules called inside the MLEDF and feed their output 
(DB) as an input to the “SNA” module.  
1. “Full-Trail” module: We create the long trail “Full-Trail” of complex MLS 
series that span over many countries. A “Full-Trail” is a concatenated 
sequence of related ML schemes acts as a whole to transfer money from one 
MLS to another. A “StartBoss” of a “Full-Trail” is the “StartBoss” of the 
first MLS in the series of MLS that constitute the “Full-Trail”. Whereas the 
“EndBoss” of a “Full-Trail” is the “EndBoss” of the last MLS in the MLS 
series that constitute the “Full-Trail”. We detect the “StartBoss” and the 
“EndBoss” of the Full-Trail, along with intermediary bosses of linked 
schemes. The “StartBoss” is the earliest known launderer (that we have 
proven evidence for) that initiates the sequence of ML transactions. The 
“EndBoss” is the final launderer that withdraws the funds or transfers them 
using remittance (Hawala) systems that do not keep any financial records. 
We start with the “EndBoss” and compute the laundering path towards its 
beginning. Then we follow all possible paths that originate at the detected 
launderer “StartBoss” and link to another launderer.  During concatenation 
of the schemes we consider the amount of funds involved, geography, 
affinity of participants, time, relation, and method for laundering.  
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Table 1 Sample Output of the Full-Trail (Up to maximum of 30 related MLS networks) 
Networks 
TrailI
D 
Duration Withdraw Amount 
Start
Boss 
End 
Boss 
24, 51, 67,  92, …. 1932 56 Days Yes 988,000 Boss 
756 
Boss  
17 
2, 15, 98, 126, ….. 72468 99 Days No 1,213,234 Boss 
29 
Boss 
592 
415, 783, 999, ….. 97246 92 Days Yes 1,050,230 Boss 
324 
Boss 
 75 
 
2. “Missing-Trail” module: We create short trails that do not exceed the depth 
of three consecutive MLSs, or three levels depth of MLSs. We assume that 
Missing-Trail is a premature Full-Trail with broken parts and missing 
evidence. Therefore we capture such shorter trails for “Suspicious-Trail” 
analysis by saving them in the “Missing-Trail” DB. 
Table 2 Sample Output of the Missing-Trail (Do not exceed 3 related MLS networks) 
Networks TrailID Duration Withdraw Amount 
Start 
Boss 
End 
Boss 
14, 219,921 1232 16 Days No 23,234 Boss 
56 
Boss 
151 
2452, 315 1208 29 Days No 90,165 Boss  
170 
Boss 
882 
405, 7831 97246 19 Days No 200,230 Boss 
 884 
Boss 
975 
 
3. Evolution-Detection module: We analyze the input feed from “Full-Trail” 
and “Missing-Trail” algorithms, and generate DB “ML-Networks” and DB 
“Detection-Schema”. The DB “ML-Network” contains three DBs of “Boss-
Boss”, “Boss-Associate” and “Associate-Associate”. The three DBs reflect 
the all discovered pair relationships among bosses and associates of MLSs 
and trails. An associate is a participant of the MLS who facilitates the 
success of MLS, such as the deposit makers in smurfing or the stock broker 
in stock based MLS. The DB “Detection-Schema” contains statistical 
information about the evolution of the ML trail, such as information of 
average cost and average number of associates used in each MLs of the 
sequence of MLSs in the Full-Trail. Table 3 shows the shortened output of 
the detected schema of the real-life case.  
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Table 3 Sample Shortened Output of Detection-Schema 
Detection 
Time 
Type SubType 
Networ
kID 
Location StartBoss EndBoss 
20120915114 HiLo Hi 2213 USA Boss756 Boss 17 
20120819139 Stock LowSale 9786 Germany Boss 324 Boss 75 
Associates Cost Amount Withdrawal Time Start Time End Time 
A, B, G, U 25,000 1,825,000 20120915114 20120830 20120915 
N, O, W, Y 14,700 1970,000 20120819124 20120725 20120819 
 
The “SNA” module will use the content of the DBs produced by the three 
evidence generation algorithms as an input. The contents of the output 
generated from the three modules listed in above tables will be saved into three 
DB named “Detection-Schema” DB, “Full-Trail” DB, and “Missing-Trail” DB. 
Every algorithm will create a DB with the same name of the algorithm name. 
Additionally, the DB “Network” associated with each MLS type will also feed 
into the SNA module.  
3.4 The Components and Output of the “SNA” Module 
The SNA module will generate the two Databases as outputs. The 
“SuspectWeight” Database contains the weight of all different relations 
detected in the MLEDF. The “Relations” Database contains the record of 
business and family relations among pairs based on the assumption that we 
have access to such records. The method to calculate the calculation is 
explained in the next section. The “SNA” module continuously updates the 
“SuspectWeight” with the value (score) of existing relations among the entities 
existing in all the DBs created in the MLEDF. 
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Table 4 Components of the Two DB Output of SNA  
RelationshipDB (    hash string,    #"time" timestamp,    type string,    person1 
string,    person2 string) PRIMARY KEY (hash, #"time", type) USING 
BTREE; 
SuspectWeightDB (hash string,    UniqueTrailBosses long, 
UniqueTrailAssociates long, UniqueMissingTrailAssociates long, 
SchemaBosses  long,  SchemaAssociateBoss long,  SchemaAssociate long, 
family long, business long, weight  long)  PRIMARY KEY (hash) 
USING BTREE; 
 
Figure 4 Sections of the Social Network Analysis Module 
The SNA module contains nine sections to continuously update the two 
Databases. Section 1 through 6 creates hashes of various relations. The sections 
7 through 9 update, query, and calculate SNA weight of family, business, and 
various ML relations derived in earlier stages. The hash of binary relations, 
that involves pair of entities, is used as the basis to calculate the accumulative 
relations of every type. The sections list is as follows: 
a. Section 1: Creates Hashes for all “StartBoss” and “EndBoss” relations, 
we refer to it as “Hash SchemaBosses”. The “StartBoss” and 
“EndBoss” are  unique to a MLS. 
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b. Section 2: Creates Hashes for all detected “Boss-Associate” relations 
we call “HashBossesAssociate”. 
c. Section 3: Creates Hashes for all detected “Associate-Associate” 
relationships. This hash represents the combinations of relationships 
among the associates of the same MLS, even if they do not 
interact/transact with each other directly.  
d. Section 4: Creates Hashes for “StartBoss”-“EndBoss” pairs of Full-
Trails, we call “HashFullTrailBosses”.  
e. Section 5: Creates Hashes for “Relationships” among socially or 
business-wise related pairs.  
f. Section 6: Creates Hashes for the associated (related) Full-Trail’s and 
Missing-Trail’s, we call “AggregateOfAssociatedTrails”. This hash 
contains a pair of TrailIDs, which are unique IDs assigned to each 
detected trail. The hash is used to relate trails by their TrailIDs. 
g. Section 7: Inserts all the outputs (hashes) of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 
6 into “SuspectWeight” DB, using “FirstInsert”.  
h. Section 8: Queries the “SuspectWeight” for the continuously updated 
outputs (hashes of Sections 1-6), then, feed the updated hashes values 
into last section. 
i. Section 9: Calculate the accumulative weight of relations using the 
“UpdatedWeight”, updating the “Relationship” table, and then 
updating the “SuspectWeight” with updated result combined from the 
new calculated weight and with “SuspectWeight”. The formula 
(method) used in this stage to sum up the accumulative weight, by 
adding the hash relations from Sections 1 through 6, is explained 
below in the next section, This final and updated weight will be used in 
the “Suspicious-Trail” module to link trails among each other. 
3.5 Social Network Analysis Algorithm 
The “Social Network Analysis” algorithm computes the weight for different 
relationships involving the bosses and associates of MLS and trails. The values 
of the weights are chosen based on the importance of relation in a scheme, that 
is to say a relation of certain type is not treated equally as a relation with less 
importance. Also the margin of weights chosen allowing an iteration of certain 
relation to be equal in weight value to another relation with a higher weight, for 
example two “Boss-Associate” relations is value wise equal to one  “Boss-
Boss” relation. 
A relationship weight is defined for each possible associate couple. The larger 
the weight, the more likely the relationship between two entities to occur. 
Weight is calculated by adding parameters for each of the corresponding 
events; therefore, the result is considered as the relationship weight. 
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a. For each detected schema, 10 will be added to start/end boss couple, 5 
for each boss/associate combination, and 1 for each associate/associate 
non-repeating combination. 
b. For each missing trail, 15 will be added to each associate non-repeating 
combination. 
c. The full trails will add 20 to each associate combination and 25 to the 
start and end boss. 
d. Other strong relationships are also counted, family ties will add 250 to 
the couple, and each business relationship will add 250 to the couple. 
1 
 
 
2 
 
3 
 
 
 
4 
5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
 
 
8 
 
 
SET BUSINESS as 250; FAMILY as 250; FULL_BOSS as 25;  
FULL_ASSOCIATE as 20; MISSING_ASSOCIATE as 15; 
SCHEMA_BOSS as 10;  
SCHEMA_ASSOACIATEBOSS as  5; SCHEMA_ASSOCIATE as 1; 
FUNCTION String HASH (String person1, String person2) 
                               {return concatenate(sort(person1,person2))};  
STREAM DetectionInputStream DetectionSchema detectedMLS; 
STREAM RelationshipInput RelationshipSchema relationship; 
STREAM MissingTrailInputStream MissingTrailSchema missingTrail; 
STREAM FullTrailInputStream FullTrailSchema fullTrail; 
STORE hashRelations IN hashAndRelationsNumberMemoryDB; 
UPDATE hashAndRelationsNumberMemoryDB as H 
   SET suspectSchemaBoss++ 
     WHERE H.hash == HASH(detectedMLS.startBoss, 
detectedMLS.endBoss); 
UPDATE hashAndRelationsNumberMemoryDB as H  
    SET suspectSchemaAssociateBoss++ 
      WHERE H.hash == HASH(detectedMLS.associate, 
detectedMLS.endBoss); 
UPDATE hashAndRelationsNumberMemoryDB as H  
    SET suspectSchemaAssociateBoss++ 
       WHERE H.hash == HASH(detectedMLS.associate, 
detectedMLS.startBoss); 
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9 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
11 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
 
14 
FOR EACH detectedMLS.associates as assoc1 
   FOR EACH detectedMLS.associates as assoc2 
      UPDATE hashAndRelationsNumberMemoryDB as H  
        SET suspectSchemaAssociate++ 
          WHERE H.hash == HASH(assoc1, assoc2); 
FOR EACH fullTrail.associates as assoc1 
   FOR EACH fullTrail.associates as assoc2 
      UPDATE hashAndRelationsNumberMemoryDB as H  
         SET suspectFullAssociate = suspectFullAssociate++ 
            WHERE H.hash == HASH(assoc1, assoc2); 
UPDATE hashAndRelationsNumberMemoryDB as H  
    SET suspectFullBoss = suspectFullBoss++ 
       WHERE H.hash == HASH(fullTrail.startBoss, fullTrail.endBoss); 
FOR EACH missingTrail.associates as assoc1 
   FOR EACH missingTrail.associates as assoc2 
      UPDATE hashAndRelationsNumberMemoryDB as H  
        SET suspectSchemaBoss = suspectMissingAssociate++ 
          WHERE H.hash == HASH(assoc1, assoc2); 
UPDATE hashAndRelationsNumberemoryDB as H  
    SET suspectBusiness = suspectBusiness + 1 
       WHERE H.hash == HASH(relationship.person1, relationship.person2)  
          AND relationship.type == "BUSINESS"; 
UPDATE hashAndRelationsNumberMemoryDB as H  
      SET suspectFamily = suspectFamily + 1 
         WHERE H.hash == HASH(relationship.person1, relationship.person2)  
            AND relationship.type == "FAMILY"; 
SELECT H.hash,  
     (FULL_ASSOCIATE*H.suspectFullAssociate + 
      FULL_BOSS*H.suspectFullBoss +  
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      MISSING_ASSOCIATE*H.suspectMissingAssociate + 
      SCHEMA_ASSOCIATE*H.suspectSchemaAssociate + 
      SCHEMA_ASSOCIATEBOSS*H.suspectSchemaAssociateBoss + 
      SCHEMA_BOSS*H.suspectSchemaBoss +  
      BUSINESS*H.suspectBusiness +FAMILY*H.suspectFamily)  as 
WeightOutputStream  
      FROM hashAndRelationsNumberMemoryDB as H; 
Query 1 The Social Network Analysis Algorithm 
In steps 1 and 2, we define the constants associated with the different weights 
and the hash functions. In steps 3 and 4, we create the input feeds and local 
(temporary) MemoryDB. In steps 5 through 8, we create the hashes of “Boss-
Boss”, “Boss-Associate”, and “Associate-Associate” of MLSs. In steps 9 
through 11, we create the same hashes of Full-Trails. In steps 12 and 13, we 
create the hash for family and business “Relations”. In step 14, we calculate the 
WeightOutput of a hash H. 
3.6 The “Suspicious-Trail” Analysis Module 
Using the “SNA” module, the “Suspicious-Trail” module produces a new trail 
that contains the full path of an evolution, after making a scientific assumption 
of a possible relation between two or more “Full-Trail” and “Missing-Trail” 
lists.  This module continuously calls the “SNA” module to fetch the social 
network connections of individuals, peer-groups, and money laundering trails. 
The sub-module “SNA” is used to derive the associated suspicious trails based 
on SNA techniques to calculate the link weight (ML relations found in all 
MLEDF DBs) and attribute (business and family relations) weight among trail 
actors. The table “Weight” that is used within the “Suspicious-Trail” module is 
completely constructed with data output from running the “SNA” module. The 
generated evolution patterns and strategies are collected into the “Suspicious-
Trail” Database. 
3.7 Suspicious-Trail Algorithm 
The “Suspicious-Trail” algorithm searches for missing and hidden links among 
ML trails. The analysis starts with any new “Full-Trail” with no more than 30 
networks (step 5). Then, the current “Full-Trail” is matched with each trail that 
complies with (step 6): 
a. Having ±10% of the current “Full-Trail” amount. 
b. A time window of 90 days between both trails’ timestamps. 
c. Location of first network of current “Full-Trail” is the same as the 
location of the last network of possible “Full-Trail” match. 
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d. Weight between current “Full-Trail” first boss and possible match 
last boss is larger than 1000. 
e. All matches are then treated separately as study cases and related to 
the current “Full-Trail” forming a “Suspicious-Trail” (steps 7 and 
8). 
1 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
8 
 
SET NetworkLimit as 30; Similar_FundPercentage as 0.1;  
SET DayWindow   as 90; SET WeightRelation as 1000 
STREAM FullTrailInputStream FullTrailSchema Trails; 
STREAM SNAOutputStream WeightSchema weight; 
STORE Trails IN TrailsMemoryDB 
SELECT Trails FROM Trails WHERE 
 (Trails.lenght <= NetworkLimit); 
SELECT Trails, db as matchTrails FROM Trails as m, TrailsMemoryDB 
as db WHERE 
 ((m.finalAmount * Similar_FundPercentage < 
current.finalAmount) AND  
 (m.finalAmount > db.finalAmount* Similar_FundPercentage) 
AND 
 ((m.detectionTime-db.detectionTime) <= days(DayWindow)) 
AND  
 (lastelement(db.networks).location == 
firstelement(m.networks).location)); 
SELECT CONCATENATE(t,m) as SuspectedTrailOutputStream 
      FROM Trails as m, matchTrails as t, weight as w WHERE 
      w.hash == sort(t.startBoss,m.endBoss) AND w.weight >= 
WeightRelation; 
SELECT CONCATENATE(m,t) as SuspectedTrailOutputStream 
      FROM Trails as m, matchTrails as t, weight as w WHERE 
      w.hash == sort(m.startBoss,t.endBoss) AND w.weight >= 
WeightRelation; 
Query 2 The Suspicious-Trail Analysis Algorithm  
In step 1, we define the constants associated with limits set to relate and 
compare trails. In steps 2 through 4, we create the input feeds including the 
SNA-generated Weight DB, and local (temporary) DB TrailsMemoryDB. In 
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step 5, we filter the analyzed trails that do not exceed 30 levels. In step 6, we 
compare and link trails that match based on criteria listed above. In steps 7 and 
8, we concatenate the matching trail with another trail, either trail or matching 
trail leading the generated outcome.  
4. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION 
It hard to obtain real-life data in the domain of ML, where one can find some 
samples used to explain complex real-life cases. Therefore we approached 
several organizations to collect sanitized real-life cases that validate the testing 
of MLEDF, meeting the requirements imposed by the organization that 
provided the sanitized cases. Our case studies are based on data provided from 
the organization we refer as Trusted Third Party (TTP), which is legally 
allowed to collect information and track records of financial exchange. The 
identity of the TTP cannot be disclosed due to a Non-Disclosure Agreement. 
The sanitized cases were provided on the basis of having the MLEDF also 
tested in the infrastructure of TTP.  
4.1 Experimental Setup 
Using the real-life dataset, we generate a larger dataset that contains different 
levels of random transaction using a module we implemented using Java.  We 
used a template from real-life cases to generate the synthetic data that is similar 
to those cases by selecting a subset of t real-life cases to create more samples 
and develop new patterns, based on criteria such as preserving duration 
flexibility, geography variation, multitude of fund transferred, crowded trails, 
trails with low funds, complex instruments such as derivative products, 
continuous transition from one financial sector to the other, splitting a 
transaction with large fund into many connected small funded MLSs, etc.  
Once we generate artificial data sets we unite all the databases to create a large 
dataset to be inserted into the MLEDF for validation and testing. All the 
“endBoss” and “startBoss” of trails and generated MLS series are compared 
against the detected ones of MLEDF.  The same test was repeated with inserted 
random patterns of small trails and MLSs in some interval to confuse the 
MLEDF and test the false positive rate (FPR) and false negative rate (FNR). 
By adding a combination of randomly generated MLS series we imitate the 
daily production environment of stock brokerage and a retail bank. The real 
validation test for MLEDF is accomplished by assessing its ability to detecting 
patterns with accuracy in a noisy environment, similar to the real life 
transactions that are filled with noise.   
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4.2 Using Real-Life Cases in the Validation Test of the MLEDF 
 
Figure 5 Real-Life Case of Evolved and Sophisticated MLS 
Our test case spans over 5 countries involving 11 companies, 10 associates, 
and 8 innocent entities. As shown in Figure 5 and Table 5, the scheme has 3 
different full trail cycles. The laundered amount is lower than the amount 
transferred by the “StartBoss” of the cycle.  The amounts in the case only 
reflect the amount laundered, either by gaining and losing, or by means of 
transferring the value. The amount does not represent the full amount of the 
transaction, which is higher than the amount laundered. The masterminds of 
the scheme are Company1 and “EndBoss”, based on the information provided 
to us by TTP. The sub-cycles of the case occur independently of each other and 
each has different rounds. Each round in each sub-cycle is in tandem with other 
rounds of the same sub-cycle. The information of individuals and companies, 
locations, and dates are all sanitized. 
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Table 5 The Subcycles and Rounds of the Full-Trail of the Real-life Case 
Cycle 
StartBoss 
Cycle  
EndBoss 
Participants Rounds Laundered 
Amount 
Company1 
Money 
Launderer 
15 5 
$260,000 
Company1 
Money 
Launderer 
4 3 
$185,000 
Company3 
Money 
Launderer 
5 3 
$185,000 
4.3 Experimental Evaluation 
We introduced a three phase testing prototype to examine MLEDF and 
detection algorithms. All of the three phases focused on testing and validating 
the components of MLS, Full-Trails, and Suspicious-Trails.   The first phase 
focus on testing all components and the other tests focus on Full-Trail and 
Suspicious-Trail components.  
Table 6 Used Testing and Validation Methodology  
Test-Validation Type  Patterns Used  Pattern Generation Method 
Test (I)Without Noise  Single MLS,  
Missing-Trail,  
Full-Trail 
StreamBase-Generated single MLS 
StreamBase-Feed Pair of MLS  
Feed Full-Trail's from Real-life Cases 
Test (II)Subtle Noise Entities, 
Transactions, 
Single MLS  
Inject same entities into Full-Trail 
Inject subtle transactions into Full-Trail 
Inject similar MLS into same Full-Trail  
Test (III)Controlled 
Data 
30LDeep Full-Trail 
20LDeep Full-Trail 
10LDeep Full-Trail 
Create 30 levels vertically deep trails 
Create 20 levels vertically deep trails 
Create 10 levels vertically deep trails 
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Table 7 Defining False Negative Rate for Each Test Phase 
Test  Patterns Used  FNR 
Test I Single MLS,  
Pair MLS,  
 
Full-Trail 
Detected MLS list is less than the input list  
Detected MLS pairs is less than the input list, or MLS pair is 
detected as single MLS 
Detected Full-Trail list is less than the input list, or Full-Trail is 
detected as Missing-Trail’s (shorter trails) and single MLSs 
Test II Entities, 
Transactions, 
Single MLS  
Missed detection of  MLS, because similar participants injected 
Missed detection of  MLS,  because identical transactions injected 
Missed detection of trail, because similar MLS injected 
Test III 30L-Deep 
 
 
20L-Deep  
 
 
10L-Deep  
30L-Deep is missed in detection, and it will cause to be detected as 
(FPR) other level deep combination of Full-Trail (less than 30L), 
Missing Trails and MLS 
Missed detection, and causing generation of FPR of Full-Trail (less 
than 20L), Missing Trails and MLS 
Missed detection, and causing generation of FPR of Full-Trail (less 
than 10L), Missing Trails and MLS 
 
Table 8 Defining False Positive Rate for Each Test Phase 
Test  Patterns Used  FPR 
Test 
I 
Single MLS,  
Pair MLS,  
Full-Trail 
Not possible as MLS is either detected or missed, as there is no noise 
Not possible as MLS pair is either detected or missed, in no-noise data 
Full-Trail is not captured, instead MLS pairs, MLS triple, or shorter 
Full-Trails are captured in lieu of the Full-Trail 
Test 
II 
Entities, 
Transactions, 
Single MLS  
Detect MLS with different participants (Associate and/or Boss) 
Detect MLS with different participants (Associate and/or Boss) 
Missed detection of the actual Full-Trail. Instead of that MLS, Missing-
Trails and shorter Full-Trails  that form the actual Full-Trail captured  
Test 
III 
30LDeep  
20LDeep  
10LDeep  
Full-Trail of desired depth (10L, 20L, 30 L) is not captured, instead a 
combination of Full-Trail of less depth, Missing-Trail, and MLS are 
captured in lieu of the actual Full-Trail 
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Test without noise: This is designed to test every module of MLEDF, 
including detection algorithms and trail analysis modules. These tests evaluate 
the FPR and FNR by comparing the results of the test with the data feed that 
contains the patterns of single MLS, pair of MLSs, and Full-Trails. The desired 
result is to have a list of the validation result identical to the list in the data 
feed.  We test the efficiency to keep up with the speed of the data feed by using 
the time window feature in the StreamBase (StreamBase 2012, 2014). By 
setting the time window to glide over only one event at a time tick in the 
StreamBase system, we required the detection algorithms to be fast at normal 
speed of one event at one time tick of the CEP system. By design, algorithm 
that cannot attain the speed of event production will not be able to capture 
MLS events or the Full-Trail, thereby generating false negatives.  
Each of the six detection algorithms are tested with its own dataset feeds in 
order to verify that we detect without FPR and FPR. The algorithm-specific 
dataset feed is generated using the built in feed generator working with our 
pattern specific event generator. Afterwards, we tested the “Missing-Trail” by 
feeding linked pairs of MLSs into the MLEDF. The linked/related pairs are 
randomly selected from the set of six types of MLS. As mentioned, any pair of 
linked MLS will make it to “Missing-Trail” and not into “Full-Trail”, due to 
the required depth. Moreover, we finally tested the detection and evolution of 
“Full-Trail”s by feeding trails generated using the various laundering strategies 
of the real-life cases.  
The process of creating the “Full-Trail” will start with creating an MLS type 
out of the six MLS types of Smurfing, Trading, DirtyEFT, Stock, Derivative, 
E-Money. Once the selection of first MLS is made, we create the linked MLS 
series based on considerations such as geography, money-amount, time, 
complexity, difficulty of tracking. The trails were created considering different 
levels of criteria, the randomization of the criteria is uniformly distributed. The 
Full-Trail feeds were created by the generator that does not exceed 10 levels of 
depth of linked MLSs. The trails are either a variant or a subsection of one of 
the real-life cases that are similar in terms of complexity and people involved 
to the case explained previously.  
At the normal speed, of one event at one time tick of the CEP system, the test 
result is zero for the false positive rates and false negative rates. It is highly 
improbable to get a false positive trail due to the business rules that define 
them, and due to the accuracy and granular level of linking transactions. We 
did not get any false positive schema in the MLS tests, due to the synthetic 
nature of the data. When we increased the speed of the feed of data generated 
to 10 times and 100 times the normal speed, we observed a FPR and FNR in 
the objects detected (Full-Trail). Increasing the speed of data-feed processing 
did not produce FPR and NFR for single MLS, but it produced FPR and FNR 
for pair MLS at speed 100X. The term “object” in the graph refers to the three 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 8(3) 
63 
different patterns of single MLS, pair MLS, and Full-Trail in the proprietary 
test of the specific object (Object in the first pattern test refers to the first 
pattern single MLS, in the second to MLS pair, in the third to Full-Trail). The 
values of FRP and FNR reflect the number of falsely detected objects. 
 
 
Figure 6 Details and False Detection Results of Test I 
Test with subtle noise: This is the most relevant test of the accuracy of our 
detection algorithms. The goal is to mislead the detection algorithms to 
generate both a false positive and false negative, with the use of subtle 
synthetic data. The test has three separate phases: injecting the scheme 
participants, injecting subtle transactions, and inserting similar MLS. A subtle 
transaction means an identical transaction with ±5% of an actual transaction 
amount in a MLS. A similar MLS means an identical MLS with the same set of 
participants but with the MLS value is ±10% of the laundered amount of the 
MLS. The injection speed was performed at normal processing speed, 10 times 
faster speed, and 100 times faster speed. The test of injecting transactions and 
MLS is setup considering each MLS type. For example, in the test of smurfing 
we create only smurfing MLS and smurfing transactions that can extend 
vertically up to 20 levels of depth and horizontally to 30 levels of depth. When 
generating the MLSs, our measures vary based on the MLS. We do not use 
artificially created none-real life cases. For example, we did not use a smurfing 
MLS with 100 levels deep, as that is uncommon and impractical to launder 
money using such MLS. We do not inject other MLSs into the injection testing 
of specific MLS. However, in the Full-Trail testing we inject all the types of 
MLS. By design of full-Trail it is required that we related different types of 
MLS under the same Full-Trail.  
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As it can be seen from Figures 7-9, the test produced low FNR and low FPR 
for transaction and MLS injection when the phases were executed at normal 
processing speed.  Those rates increased in the phases when tests were 
executed at faster processing speed. One way to imitate the data feed pace of 
real production environment is to run the CEP tests at faster pace, which means 
overloading the system with processing and analytics while attempting to keep 
pace with the data feed. The goal was to evaluate the effectiveness of “Full-
Trail” detection when the system absorbs data at a higher rate while 
performing the analysis. Due to the design methodology of detection 
algorithms and the complexity of the business rules of MLS detection, their 
false detection rates stayed at low levels even with injection similar 
transactions and MLSs, at a higher data-feed speed.  
Meeting the design principles, the “Full-Trail” and “Suspicious-Trail” results 
remained at low rates for both false positive and false negative. Therefore, all 
the subtle single MLS created with our injected data ended in the “Missing-
Trail”s, where they do not exceed the depth of 3 consecutive MLSs. Among 
the reasons for such success in trail analysis and avoiding any negative impact 
are the following: (1) Designing MLEDF in such a strict and granular method, 
especially for matching the MLSs within the trails; (2) Using the SNA in the 
trail analysis algorithms; and (3) Adopting the criterion of following the 
direction of the money flow. MLS is not expected to terminate with funds 
remaining in the account. The money must flow in some direction in order to 
be laundered, or must be withdrawn by the launderer.  
 
 
 
Figure 7 Details and False Detection Results of Test II-Entity Injection 
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Figure 8 Details and False Detection Results of Test II-Transaction Injection 
 
 
Figure 9 Details and False Detection Results of Test II- Similar MLS Injection 
 
Test with longer synthetic full-trails: This is the hardest level of performance-
testing of the system and accuracy-testing of the detection algorithms. The 
dataset is permutated over a repository of the different real-life cases. 
Afterwards, the dataset is combined with randomized MLS to generate deep 
vertical levels of “Full-Trail” and “Suspicious-Trail”. The randomization 
follows the same principles we used in Test II, the injection testing. The test is 
designed to assess the performance of MLEDF in capturing real-life data and 
analyzing them on the fly. The desired test result is to generate low FPR and 
FNR. The test module generates all synthetic data from real-life cases. The test 
is as similar as it can be to real-life scenarios, considering that there are limited 
ways to manipulate a MLS. The test program functions as follows: (1) Set a 
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trail depth. The program enters a loop and builds a trail by choosing a first 
scheme from of each MLS type at random, as it was described in Test I in 
building the Full-Trails; (2) The loop continues by creating an MLS that can be 
linked by funds, time, location and complexity wise to the current MLS. We 
repeat the step above with the exception of not creating any Smurfing MLS for 
the rest of the levels; (3) The permutation continues until we reach the last 
level, where we always choose an MLS of type DirtyEFT with withdrawal, in 
order to generate the trail termination point, as by definition a trail will end 
with withdrawal; (4) The test repeats the process of trail generation forever, 
and at the maximum possible speed; and (5) The testing module saves the 
arrival time of the last DirtyEFT and subtracts that from the build time of the 
trail. Thereby, we obtain the difference in Milliseconds, which represents the 
time duration for trail processing. 
The data was generated for worst-case scenarios. By doing so we ensure that 
the generated data is more complex and that the performance is evaluated only 
in most resource consuming cases. Displayed results represent the performance 
of data generated without any repetitive bosses or associates. Hence, the 
dataset is consumes a significant number of resource  
Figure 10 False Detection Results and Details of Test III 
3.4 Data Characteristics 
We introduced six MLS types with different subtypes for each sector. The 
combination of schemes is novel in its entirety as they were driven from real-
life cases. The novelty lies in: (1) creating patterns from real life cases using 
CEP system; (2) developing a software that can read patterns from real-life or 
synthetic cases and evolve it based on criteria we implemented; and (3) 
attempting to link the networks of from those cases to produce different MLS 
variations that involve all well-known MLS. 
In the first test, we used the StreamBase (SB) simulator (StreamBase 2012, 
2013) and MLS DB to feed data into the application. In the tests of the MLS 
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pair and “Full-Trail”, the simulator retrieves the DB data and generates 
samples. In the single MLS test, we feed the DB data into the simulator to 
generate samples from a pool of a specific set of MLS. The “Full-Trail” dataset 
contains variants and subsections from five real-life cases. The dataset was in 
CVS format, and contained 292,000 MLS records that constituted a total of 
12,000 “Full-Trail” records. The dataset contained 1.4 million transactions. In 
the second test, we used a modified version of the dataset that contains subtle 
transactions and identical MLSs. We injected 20,000 identical MLS and 95,000 
subtle transactions using the simulator. In the third test, we implemented a Java 
program to stream the generated data into the MLEDF.  
4.5 Testing Performance 
In order to test performance using the environment described above, we 
executed three major tests over three different data sets. The third simulation 
test was the most crucial test, as the data feed resembles the data feed seen on a 
daily basis in a bank or in a brokerage house.  
The processing ratio is ideal, obviously workable to be faster. The trail 
processing time decreases with the deeper trails because there are less MLS per 
object in this case. However, it is a good indicator because it means that in 
more healthy situations, the system will be faster in responding to troubles. The 
processing time both for objects and MLSs is set to be ideal on 20-depth trails. 
This implies that the system is more suitable to trails of that particular depth. 
With our assessed speed to get ~0.5 objects/millisecond processing, and for 
such a system, this is significant. While the processing ratio can be very 
subjective to the number of markets, for banks and other feeds connected to the 
system, a productive version of a system like this will need to be scaled in 
order to meet that ratio. 
Figure 11 Performance Test Results 
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4.6 The Validation Statement 
We used the SB Studio Feed Simulation platform for performing our tests 
during the validation: (1) to connect it to module generator of Test III to 
retrieve the deep Full-Trails; (2) to connect it to the data-feed we used in Test 
II; and (3) to create noise-free pure data in Test I. Although there are higher 
performance opportunities promised by vendors, SB in particular, we observed 
that our queries reveal reasonable outcomes in terms of performance tests, even 
using this none-enterprise test environment. We also observed that the queries 
result in reasonable accuracy values given the specially crafted synthetic data 
sets. Given the data set, we successfully determined a reasonable window size 
for window-based queries. Using attributes, we could also successfully 
converge the evidence outcomes by tuning the force of time, property, and key-
based patterns directing those queries. 
RELATED WORK 
The system created by FINCEN AI System (FAIS) (Senator et al., 1995, 1998) 
is a similar system in terms of the concept of detecting MLS. The drawback of 
the system is that it does not capture live data (i.e., running data connected to 
banking systems) and requires the involvement of an expert in the link 
analysis, and tying MLS and transactions. Whereas our system does not need 
the involvement of an expert and captures live, as well as feeds the data into 
the SB engine. The KDPrevent system (Jacobs et al., 2003; Kuns et al., 2004) 
is the most private product that is similar to our product in terms of the logic of 
including the background of the transactions of individual and groups. The 
KDPrevent system is also based on data mining techniques that is not real-time 
and necessitates the involvement of experts.  Gunestas, et al. (2010) conducted 
a similar study in the financial transaction forensics, with a focus only on Ponzi 
schemes. The framework only captures one form of transaction only from the 
web services transactions. Our framework can be accepted as a continuance to 
(Gunestas et al., 2010) for MLS and accepting all forms of transactions, 
including the banking transactions.  
6.  CONCLUSION 
We have created a framework to detect the evolution of MLS and implemented 
a system to include SNA for detecting and linking related ML networks. The 
linkage will function properly even when all evidence is unavailable. We 
defined the choreographies that could be used to detect the evolution of the 
sophisticated MLS. We have shown how to detect and capture the evolving and 
complex trails of MLS using SB. Although our choreographies only specify 
well-known money laundering schemes, the framework can be updated with 
business rules to capture any form of other MLS that can be mined from 
repositories of financial transactions. Our ongoing work addresses the 
extension of our method in developing an online warning system that detects 
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MLS that appear legitimate from an abstract view, but are illegitimate from the 
detailed view. Currently, we are working to produce algorithms to prevent 
transactions from a sequence of financial transactions, based on our detection 
system and proprietary scoring system. 
REFERENCES 
Gunestas, M., Wijesekera, D., & Singhal, A. (2008). Forensic web services.  
Fourth Annual IFIP WG 11.9 Conference on Digital Forensics. 
Gunestas, M., Mehmet, M., & Wijesekera, D. (2010). Detecting illegal 
business schemes in choreographed web services: The Ponzi/Pyramidal case. 
Sixth Annual IFIP WG 11.9 Conference on Digital Forensics. 
Jacobs, L., & Wyss, R. (2003). KDPrevent: White paper: intelligent detection 
of money laundering and other financial crimes. KDLabs Reports 2003. 
Kunz, B., & Peter, S. (2004). KDPrevent: detecting money laundering 
activities. KDLabs Reports 2004. 
Liu, X., Zhang, P., & Zeng, D. (2008). Sequence matching for suspicious 
activity detection in anti-money laundering. Proceedings of the IEEE ISI 2008 
PAISI, PACCF, and SOCO. 
Mehmet, M., & Wijesekera, D. (2010). Ontological constructs to create money 
laundering schemes. Semantic Technologies for Intelligence, Defense, and 
Security Year 2010. 
Mehmet, M., & Wijesekera, D. (2013). Detecting the evolution of money 
laundering schemes. Ninth Annual IFIP WG 11.9 Digital Forensics.  
Schwartz, D., & Rouselle, T. (2008). Using social network analysis to target 
criminal networks. Trends in Organized Crime Year 2008. 
Senator, T., Goldberg, H., Wooton, J., Cottini, A., Umar, A., Klinger, C., 
Llamas, W., …Wong, R. (1995). The FinCEN artificial intelligence system: 
Identifying potential money laundering from reports of large cash transactions. 
The 7th Conference on Innovative Applications of AI. 
Senator, T., & Goldberg, H. (1996). Restructuring databases for knowledge 
discovery by consolidation and link formation. The Second International 
Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining. 
Senator, T., Goldberg, H., & Wong, R. (1998). Restructuring transactional data 
for link analysis in the FinCEN AI system. AAAI Technical Report FS-98-01. 
StreamBase. (2012). Powerful real-time architecture for today’s high 
performance modern intelligence systems. Federal Government, Defense, and 
Intelligence applications of Year 2012. 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 8(3) 
70 
StreamBase. (2013). StreamSQL Guide. Retrieved from  
http://www.streambase.com/streamsql/. 
Wasserman, S., & Faust, K. (1994). Chapters 1, 2, and 13. In Social Network 
Analysis: Methods and Applications. Cambridge University Press, London. 
 
